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Non-cooperative game approach for task
offloading in edge clouds
Bo Yang, Member, IEEE , Zhiyong Li, Member, IEEE , and Wenbin Liu
Abstract—Task offloading provides a promising way to enhance the capability of the mobile terminal (also called terminal user) that is
distributed on network edge and communicates edge clouds with wireless. Generally, there are multiple edge cloud nodes with distinct
processing capability in a geographic area, which can offer computing service for various terminal users. Furthermore, the terminal
users are competitive and selfish, i.e., each user takes into account only maximizing her own profit, while conducting task offloading
strategies. In this paper, we focus on the resource management optimization for edge clouds, and formulate the problem of resource
competition among terminal users as a non-cooperative game, in which the terminal user who acts as the player always pursues the
minimization of the expected response time for her tasks by optimizing allocation strategies. We present the utility function of the user
with queuing theory, and then prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for the formulated game. Using the concept of Nash bargaining
solution to calculate the optimal task offloading scheme for the user, we propose a distributed task offloading algorithm with low
computation complexity. The results of simulated experiments demonstrate that our method can quickly reach the Nash equilibrium
point, and deliver satisfying performance at the expected response time of the user’s tasks.
Index Terms—Edge cloud, expected response time, game theory, Nash bargaining solution, task offloading
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
W Ith the development of high-powered mobile ter-minals and 5G communication technologies, mobile
computing has received extensive attention. In this scenario,
the applications of the mobile user often are offloaded to
the cloud due to the capability constraint of the terminal.
For example, to quickly respond the computing-intensive
speech recognition, Google Voice Search and Apple Siri
always request computing resources from cloud data centers
[1]. However, they might suffer the risk of uncertain delay
caused by the network while the user’s tasks are transmitted
to the remote cloud data center via multiple network nodes.
To address the problem, the edge cloud computing (ECC)
model has been emerged. Unlike traditional cloud comput-
ing models, it transfers a number of computing resources
from the cloud to network edges closest to the user, allowing
time-sensitive tasks to be processed nearby and avoiding the
uncertainty of transmission delay [2].
Due to the advantage of the proximate access for the
mobile user, ECC has been widely agreed to be a key
technology for the mobile computing. However, compared
to traditional large-scale cloud computing, an ECC node is
usually equipped with only small or medium size comput-
ing resources because of the limit of the physical space.
Hence, it cannot meet all users when the number of user
requests is relatively large. In fact, a mobile user can obtain
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identical service from various ECC nodes in a physical field,
whereas a ECC node can also provide service for multiple
users. Accordingly, it is inevitable to consider the load
balancing among ECC nodes, so that the system can provide
better experience for the users. The existing researches for
ECC mainly focused on the task offloading between the
mobile device and the edge cloud node, such as user ap-
plication partitioning and offloading [3], [4], access control
[5], [6] and so on. Although these researches in these areas
are very important, they did not taken into account both
of the resource competition among users and the queuing
delay of user tasks in ECC systems.
Without loss of generality, most of the mobile users in the
ECC system are time-sensitive and independent from each
other. The objective of the user is to minimize the expected
response time of her tasks while she makes decisions for
task offloading. However, to capture this objective, there
are several significant points that need further considera-
tion. For examples, the users of ECC systems are free to
act independently in a selfish manner, such that achieving
satisfactory experience for users is difficult due to no central
authority in the system; the response time of the user task
not only refers to its running time and transmission delay,
but also includes its queuing delay on the ECC node. No-
tably, the processing capability of the mobile terminal is far
lower than that of the edge cloud node in fact. Nevertheless,
the mobile users can also execute their own part of tasks
locally when external computing resources provided by the
edge cloud node cannot meet their requirements [3], [5].
However, currently task offloading strategies completely
considering above scenarios have not been well studied.
Therefore, it is still a challenge to design an efficient, sta-
ble and distributed method of task offloading in the ECC
system.
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1.2 Our contributions
Game theory can provide a natural paradigm to design
decentralized mechanisms [7], which can help obtain an
in-depth analytical understanding of the task allocation
problem of ECCs. Accordingly, in this study, we introduce
the game theoretic approach to address the aforementioned
issues. In our model, ECC users, who act as players, com-
pete with one another in sharing resources distributed in
multiple ECC nodes in a physical field. To minimize the
average response time of tasks, they can decide which
ECC nodes will process their requirements by observing
the running scenario, such as the available computing re-
sources, the transmitting delay and the service levels of their
requirements. Our main contributions are summarized as
follows.
Our schemes consider the expected response time that
includes both of the queueing time and the transmitting de-
lay for tasks. We establish a queueing model to characterize
the computing node in the ECC system. The task offloading
problem of each user is viewed as a centralized problem in
our schemes, because each mobile user independently acts
with a selfish manner. Furthermore, to ease the difficulty
of solving the problem, Nash bargaining solution (NBS)
method is adopted to calculate the optimal strategy for the
mobile user.
Additionally, we propose a non-cooperative game frame-
work for the mobile edge cloud system, in which each
mobile user can selfishly minimize her payoff by making op-
timal strategy for her task offloading with the NBS method.
We prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium of the
proposed game. Moreover, corresponding algorithms are
given to find the best response of the mobile user, and can
converge to an efficient equilibrium after several iterations.
The experimental results demonstrate that our approaches
are effective and efficient.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first
discuss related works in Section 2, and then introduce the
system model in Section 3. We provide the formulation of
the resources allocation problem and present the detailed
description of the proposed algorithms in Sections 4 and 5,
respectively. We discuss the simulation results that demon-
strate the effectiveness of our approach in Section 6. Finally,
the conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
In recent years, due to the improvement of communica-
tion technology and mobile terminals, more resources of
cloud computing have been transferred to the network edge
closed to customers. The existing researches on ECCs are
mainly focus on the problem model and resource manage-
ment of the system [8]. In this section, we will discuss the
associated work from following aspects: the task partition,
and the task offloading among multiple users in ECCs.
Generally, a mobile computing task is consist of multiple
procedures, such as the augment reality (AR) task, which
has five critical procedures: the video collection, the tracker,
the mapper, the object recognizer, and the renderer. Among
these procedures, the computation-intensive procedures,
i.e., the tracker, mapper and object recognizer can be of-
floaded for cloud execution, others can be performed locally
[8]. In this way, the mobile user can enjoy various benefits
from ECCs using distinct partition algorithms. Hence, a se-
ries of task offloading approaches are proposed to optimize
the system performance [3], [9]–[11].
Ref [3] focused on the upper bound of the system per-
formance, and investigated the problem of the task partition
and placement, in which the user’s task and the physical
computing system are mapped into two types of nodes that
are labelled as the requirement and the available resource
in a graph respectively, and then an approximate online
algorithm was proposed to solve the optimal matching for
the two types of nodes in this graph. Considering the sce-
nario where the available resources are constrained in ECCs,
authors of Ref [9] investigated the task partition methods
that minimize the expected time of user tasks. Xiang et al.
proposed a consolidated method to coordinate the task
partition while conducting the task offloading strategy. In
their work, saving energy is realized by reducing the time
of the net interface working at high power [10]. Chang et al.
studied the task placement approach for the application of
Internet of Thing in the edge cloud, where the time-sensitive
components of the task are executed on the edge cloud node
by splitting the task seamlessly [11].
Above investigations primarily focused on minimizing
energy consumption and time delay, or considering the
tradeoff of them. In fact, the multi-step task partitioning
and placement in ECCs still encounter numerous challenges
even if it is a simple task partitioning and placement. More-
over, these investigations mostly used heuristic algorithms
to solve such problems [12]. It is well known that these
methods generally have high computing complexity, and
hence can not guarantee the performance. Furthermore,
above studies neglected the task congestion or queuing
delay, i.e., the user task arriving on an edge computing
node may have to wait for a certain time before it can be
executed. It would significantly harm the user’s experience
if the waiting time is too long.
For the scenario of multiple users, the popular schemes
employed by existing studies for the resource management
in ECCs can be classified into two types: centralization and
decentralization. In these investigations [13]–[15] with cen-
tralized strategies, the edge cloud node has the completed
information of all users, such as the resource request of
the user, makes decisions for resource allocation and then
sends them to users. Ref [14] studied resource allocation for
a multiuser mobile edge cloud system, where the optimal
resource allocation is formulated as a convex optimization
problem for minimizing the weighted sum mobile energy
consumption under the constraint on computation latency.
Chen et al. aimed to minimize the overall cost of energy,
computation and delay for all users, and formulated the
optimization of the offloading decision as a non-convex
quadratically constrained quadratic program [13]. Their
work is further extended in the literature [15], e.g., the
computation resource allocation and processing cost were
taken into account.
For the investigations with decentralization approaches,
Sardellitti et al. formulated the offloading problem as a joint
optimization of the radio resources and the computational
resources, and provided a distributed resource scheduling
algorithm using successive convex approximation technique
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to minimize the overall users’ energy consumption, while
meeting latency constraints [16]. Similarly, authors of lit-
erature [17] proposed a distributed resource scheduling
algorithm to reduce energy consumption and shorten ap-
plication completion time in mobile edge clouds. However,
the above studies did not considered the queuing delay and
the user selfishness in the scenario of multiple users.
Moreover, the non-cooperative game approach, as a type
of decentralized method, has obtained extensive attentions
in current mobile edge computing fields. Ref [5], [18] as-
sumed that the user tasks can run on the local terminal
or the edge cloud, modelled the competing traffic channel
among multiple users as a non-cooperative game, and pro-
posed a task offloading approach being able to reach Nash
equilibrium (NE). Cardellini et.al. investigated a scenario
in which multiple non-cooperative users share the limited
computing resources of close-by cloudlets in a fixed field
and can selfishly determine to assign their computations to
any of the three tiers, e.g., a local tier of mobile terminals, a
middle tier of ECCs, and a remote tier of cloud servers [19].
Nevertheless, their work is for a single mobile edge cloud,
and ignored a fact that there are multiple mobile edge nodes
that can simultaneously offer services for users in a physi-
cal area. Considering a scenario that exists multiple users
competing sharing computation resources provisioned by
multiple ECCs in a field, Li et al. employed the queuing
model to characterize the mobile edge cloud server, and
proposed a non-cooperative game algorithm to find the op-
timal computation offloading strategy for the mobile users
and multiple ECCs [20]. Although similar technologies are
used in our work, the difference from their work is that we
combine the Nash Bargain Solution (NBS) and the concept
of non-cooperative game to calculate the optimal allocation
scheme of the user, such that the analytic solution of the task
allocation for each user can be quickly obtained.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the models for the mobile
edge cloud and user respectively. For the convenience of
the readers, the major notations used in this paper are listed
in Table 1.
3.1 Model of the mobile edge cloud
Similar to WiFi APs, in a given physical area, we as-
sume that there exists a mobile edge cloud system
M, which has m edge cloud nodes (ECN), M =
{ECN1, ECN2, · · · , ECNm}. An edge cloud node can be
envisioned as a small data center such as Cloudlet, which is
able to provision service for the users closed to it, avoiding
the unacceptable delay yielded by the uncertain network
influence while the user task is transmitted to remote clouds
through multiple network nodes. Moreover, there are a
number of mobile users who can access certain edge cloud
nodes in the area. Let N = {MU1,MU2, · · · ,MUn} repre-
sent the set of mobile users. Fig. 1 describes the model of the
edge cloud system.
Assume that each mobile user generates tasks in terms of
a Poisson process and independently of other mobile users.
The task execution requirements (measured by the number
TABLE 1
Notations
Symbol Meaning
i Subscript of the mobile user or terminal
MUi Mobile user or terminal i
j Subscript of the computing node(e.g., edge cloud node,
local terminal)
M Set of the edge cloud node
m The number of edge cloud nodes
N Set of the mobile user
ECNj Edge cloud node j
µˆi Available processing rate ofMUi
λˆi Task arrival rate ofMUi
T li Average response time of the tasks deployed on local
computing forMUi
T ei Average response time of the tasks deployed on ECNs
forMUi
Ti Overall average response time of the tasks forMUi
ρi Task allocation probability vector forMUi
ρij Probability assigning the task belonged toMUi to com-
puting node j
µij Processing rate that computing node j can provision to
MUi
Hi Set of available computing nodes forMUi
ρ
−i Task allocation probability vector of the users excepted
user i
Lij Mean delay of transmitting a task ofMUi to computing
node j
µij Available processing rate forMUi on computing node j
Q Joined strategy set of all players
T maxi Acceptable maximum value of the expected task re-
sponse time forMUi
µ0ij Initial processing rate specified by MUi for computing
node j
Local
Edge Cloud
Edge Cloud
Local
Local
Local
Edge Cloud
Fig. 1. Mobile edge cloud model
of instructions to be executed) are i.i.d. exponential random
variables r with mean r¯. An edge cloud node j performs
the user task with speed sj (measured by the number of
instructions executed in one unit of time), and the execution
times on the node are i.i.d. exponential random variables
xj = r/sj with mean xj = r/sj . Hence, the average
processing rate of the edge cloud node in one unit of time
can be denoted by µj = 1/xj . Moreover, an edge cloud
node maintains a queue with infinite capacity for waiting
tasks, where the first-come-first-served queuing discipline
is adopted. Such an edge cloud node can be modeled as an
M/M/1 queuing system.
Notably, considering the fact that the service time of
user tasks obeys general distributions, the M/G/1 queuing
model should be more appropriate for them. However, there
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is still not a simple close-form solution for this queuing
model, which can help us to understand the effect of the
task size variability on the mean response time [21].
Let λj denote the task arrival rate on edge cloud node
ECNj with an average processing rate µj . In terms of
Little law [21], the average response time of ECNj can be
calculated by
Tj =
1
µj − λj
. (1)
For the system stability, the task arrival rate must be
lower than the processing rate in an ECN. Hence, the
following inequality should be hold.
λj < µj , ∀j ∈M. (2)
Otherwise, the queue at the ECNwill build up to infinity
and the expected response time for the user task will be
infinite.
3.2 Model of the edge cloud user
Generally, the edge cloud user has a certain computing
capability, which is far lower than that of the ECN, and
can also offload her tasks to closed ECNs or remote cloud
servers by the wireless network, while having to tackle the
tasks with realtime requirements. Without loss of generality,
in order to maximize her own profit, an edge cloud user
may distribute strategically her tasks to suitable points (such
as closed ECNs and her own intelligent terminal). Fig. 2
characterizes the model of the edge cloud user.
Local
Edge Cloud
TasksO
Fig. 2. Edge cloud user model
Minimizing the expected response time of the task has
become an inevitable problem in themobile edge computing
due to the time-sensitive requirement of the task. Notably,
saving energy is also extremely significant in the scenarios
with constrained energy provisioning. Nevertheless, it is
no longer the primary goal in numerous edge computing
occasions, e.g., pilotless automobile, speech recognition, ar-
gument reality and so on, even it may be negligible in these
cases. Accordingly, for simplification, we do not take energy
saving into account in this study.
Moreover, a user terminal with a certain computing
capability can be regarded as a small server. Hence, we also
employ the queuing model to characterize it. Let λˆi denote
the task arrival rate ofMUi in a time interval, and µˆi is her
average processing rate for the task. Given that the quantity
of tasks assigned to ECNs byMUi is λ
e
i , then the number of
tasks remaining at her own terminal is denoted by λli, which
is written by
λli = λˆi − λ
e
i , (3)
where
λei ∈ [0, λˆi]. (4)
According to Eq. (1), the average response time of tasks
deployed on local terminal forMUi is given as
T li =
1
µˆi − λli
. (5)
WhileMUi’s tasks are deployed on ENCs for execution,
the total time overhead for these tasks mainly consists of
the processing time T pi and the transmitting time T
t
i , and is
given as
T ei = T
p
i + T
t
i . (6)
Here, the returned time of computing results is omitted.
In our models, the mobile user, as an intelligent and selfish
individual, is always greedy to search the computing nodes,
which can promise the maximization of her own interests,
and then allocates her tasks to them such that her interests
are maximized. That is, minimizing the average response
time of the task means the maximization of user interests in
our work.
Furthermore, Each mobile user should be aware of the
fact that the ECNs are serving other mobile users, while
making decisions of task offloading. Hence, the interests
of each mobile user rely on the strategies of others. It is
reasonable that using the game theory to model the compe-
tition among the mobile users, which can help obtain an in-
depth analytical understanding of the service provisioning
problem of ENCs.
4 NON-COOPERATIVE GAME FOR TASK OFFLOAD-
ING
From aforementioned discussions, the mobile user can be
viewed as the player in the non-cooperative game, and
selfishly makes strategy profiles to maximize her interest.
Following the routine, the following problem is how to for-
mulate an non-cooperative game, which can quickly reach
a stable situation where the task offloading strategy of each
user is optimal and no one wants to change it.
4.1 Game formulation for task offloading
In the edge computing situation, a mobile user can dis-
tribute her tasks to any closed computing nodes including
ECNs and her own terminal. For representation conve-
nience, throughout the paper, the edge cloud node and user
local terminal are collectively called computing nodes. The
set of available computing nodes forMUi is represented by
Hi =M∪{MUi}.
In our models, the mobile users are rational, and act
independently in a selfish manner that maximizes their own
interests. Let ρi denote a probability profile determining
MUi’s task allocation. To minimize the task response time,
MUi will do her best to achieve an optimal ρi.
ρi = {ρi1, · · ·, ρij , · · ·, ρiH},
where ρij denotes the probability by that MUi assigns her
tasks to computing node j, and
∑H
j=1 ρij = 1, H = m + 1.
The strategy profile set ofMUi is given as
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Qi =

ρi
∣∣∣∣∣
H∑
j=1
ρij = 1 and ρij ≥ 0

 . (7)
While having determined the task allocation probability
vector ρi, MUi will assign her tasks to computing nodes in
terms of it. In addition, the available computing capability
of each computing node forMUi is represented as follows:
Si = {µ
i
1, · · · , µ
i
j , · · · , µ
i
H},
where µij represents the processing rate that computing
node j can provision toMUi.
Let the strategy profile of other mobile users is ρ−i =
{ρ1, · · · , ρi−1, ρi+1, · · · , ρn}, and the time of transmitting a
task fromMUi to computing node i is denoted by Lij (if the
destination is herself, i.e., i = j, then Lij = 0). Combining
Eqs (1) and (6), the utility function of MUi, i.e., her overall
excepted response time of the task, can be written as
Ti(ρi, ρ−i) =
H∑
j=1
ρij
(
1
µij − ρij λˆi
+ ρij λˆiLij
)
(8)
Obviously, the mobile user, as a selfish individual, is
bound to seek an optimal strategy to maximize her interests.
Here, the optimal strategy ofMUi is defined as follows
Definition 4.1. (Optimal Strategy) Given the strategy profiles
of other mobile users ρ−i, MUi’s optimal strategy is ρ
∗
i ∈ Qi, if
she prefers ρ∗i to any other strategy ρi ∈ Qi. That is
Ti(ρ
∗
i , ρ−i) ≤ Ti(ρi, ρ−i), i = 1, · · · , n. (9)
Generally, a non-cooperative game comprises of the set
of players, the strategy of the player and the set of players’
strategies [7]. In our models, the mobile user is the player in
the game, the player collection is denoted byN , the strategy
set of each playerMUi is given by Qi, and the joined strat-
egy set of all players is represented by Q = Q1 × · · · × Qn.
Formally, we characterize the above game as a 2-tuple
G = 〈Q, T 〉, where T = (T1, · · · , Tn). Given the joined
strategies of other participants ρ−i, the objective of MUi
is to achieve the optimal strategy ρ∗i ∈ Qi, which minimizes
the excepted response time of her tasks, Ti(ρi, ρ−i). That is
ρ∗i ∈ argmin
ρi∈Qi
Ti(ρi, ρ−i), (ρi, ρ−i) ∈ Q. (10)
The Nash equilibrium has a beneficial self-stability prop-
erty, such that all selfish players at equilibrium can achieve a
mutually satisfactory solution and no one has the incentive
to change anymore. Therefore, given that the jointed opti-
mal strategies of other participants ρ∗−i, we have following
inequality for the mobile userMUi at the Nash equilibrium.
Ti(ρ
∗
i , ρ
∗
−i) ≤ Ti(ρi, ρ
∗
−i), i = 1, · · · , n. (11)
Obviously, the existence of the Nash equilibrium in a
non-cooperative game is an essential condition ensuring the
system stability. Hence, more attentions should be placed on
it while designing a distributed task offloading mechanism
with the game theory.
4.2 Analysis of the Nash equilibrium existence
Following aforementioned discussions, the existence of the
Nash equilibrium implies that the approach proposed by
us is feasible. Hence, we will discuss and analyse the Nash
equilibrium existence for the non-cooperative game G =
〈Q, T 〉 in this subsection.
Lemma 4.1. For eachMUi, given a convex and compact strategy
set Qi, and the function of the task expected response time
Ti(ρi, ρ−i), which is continuously differentiable on ρi ∈ Qi, the
function Ti(ρi, ρ−i) is convex on ρi ∈ Qi for any strategy profile
ρ−i.
Proof. Obviously, the strategy set of each users Qi is con-
vex and compact in our game model, and the function of
the task expected response time Ti(ρi, ρ−i) is continuously
differentiable on ρi. In terms of literatures [22], [23], if
the Hessian matrix of the function Ti(ρi, ρ−i) is positive
semidefinite,then the above lemma would hold.
According to Eq. (8), the first derivative of the function
Ti(ρi, ρ−i) forMUi’s strategy vector ρi is given as
∇ρiTi(ρi, ρ−i) =
[
∂Ti(ρi, ρ−i)
∂ρij
]H
j=1
=
(
∂Ti(ρi, ρ−i)
∂ρi1
, . . . ,
∂Ti(ρi, ρ−i)
∂ρiH
)
=
(
µi1
(µi1 − ρi1λˆi)
2
+ 2ρi1λˆiLi1,
. . . ,
µiH
(µi1 − ρiH λˆi)
2
+ 2ρiH λˆiLiH
)
,
and its Hessian matrix is expressed as
∇2ρiTi(ρi, ρ−i) = diag
{[
∂2Ti(ρi, ρ−i)
∂(ρij)2
]H
j=1
}
= diag


[
2µijλˆi
(µij − ρij λˆi)
3
+ 2λˆiLij
]H
j=1

 .
(12)
We learn that inequality µij > ρij λˆi must hold in terms of
Expression (2); otherwise, the queue will build up to infinity
and the expected response time for the task will be infinite.
Accordingly, the diagonal matrix in Eq. (12) has all diagonal
elements being positive. Hence, the Hessian matrix of the
function Ti(ρi, ρ−i) is positive semidefinite and the result
follows.
This remark completes the proof.
Theorem 4.1. Non-cooperative game G = 〈Q, T 〉 exists a Nash
equilibrium at least.
Proof. In terms of the results of literatures [24], [25], an non-
cooperative game existing a Nash equilibrium must satisfy
two conditions: first, the strategy setQi for each userMUi is
an non-empty convex closed and upper-bounded subset on
Euclidean space; second, given the joined strategies of other
users ρ−i, the utility function ofMUi, i.e., the function of the
task expected response time Ti(ρi, ρ−i) is continuously dif-
ferentiable and convex for any strategy ρi ∈ Qi. Obviously,
the two conditions are satisfied in the game G = 〈Q, T 〉
according to lemma 4.1 and the result follows.
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this remark completes the proof.
5 ALGORITHM DESIGN
In this section, we focus on the implement of the distributed
task offloading approach for the non-cooperative game G
formulated above. Here, a decentralized task offloading
frame promising the maximization of the user utility is
proposed.
5.1 Optimal task offloading algorithm for users
Before the system arrives a Nash equilibrium, every step
of improvement update carried by the participant in the
game G is to minimize the task expected response time,
such that her utility reaches maximization. That is, the best
response of each participant is the solution for the following
optimization problem (labeled P1).
P1 minimize Ti(ρi, ρ−i), i = 1, · · · , n. (13)
However, it is significantly difficult to directly address
the above problem. In fact, while making the optimal de-
cision for the task offloading at each step of improvement
update, every participant considers only the computing re-
sources being available for herself, but the affection yielded
by others’ strategies on her.
Hence, the optimization problem for each participant
may be viewed as a centralized decision problem. Taking
advantage of Nash bargaining solution (NBS) addressing
such problems [26]–[28], we will adopt the NBS approach to
solve it in our work.
Generally, each user has a maximum toleration for the
average response time of the task. Let T maxi denote it for
MUi. Therefore, the following constraint for any user must
be met when she conducts task allocation on a computing
node.
1
µij − λ
max
ij
+ λmaxij Lij ≤ T
max
i , (14)
where λmaxij is the maximum rate with thatMUi can assign
her tasks to computing node j under given constraints, such
as T maxi , µ
i
j and Lij . The available processing rate µ
i
j can be
obtained by observing the current state of computing node
j by MUi. By several algebraic calculation, We have the
following results in terms of the above inequality.
λmaxij =
T maxi + Lijµ
i
j ± ω
2Lij
, (15)
where
ω =
√
(T maxi + Lijµ
i
j)
2 − 4Lij(T maxi µ
i
j − 1).
Notably, the following constraints must be satisfied.
µij > λ
max
ij ≥ 0, (16)
T maxi − λ
max
ij Lij > 0. (17)
Otherwise, the system will be impractical. Constraint
(16) guarantees the non-negative of the performance pro-
vided toMUi by computing node j. Expression (17) implies
that the transmitting delay can not exceed to the maximum
value being acceptable for the user. Therefore, Equation (15)
can be rewritten as
λmaxij =
T maxi + Lijµ
i
j − ω
2Lij
. (18)
If either of expressions (16) and (17) cannot be satisfied
on computing node j, then the maximum rate λmaxij with
that MUi can assign tasks to this computing node should
be set to 0.
For applying the NBS method in our game model, the
initial processing rate on computing node j for MUi is
denoted by µ0ij , which is the maximum processing rate that
computing node j can provision to MUi without violating
constraints (16) and (17). Obviously, there is µ0ij = λ
max
ij ,
those computing nodes with initial processing rate 0 will be
removed. Moreover, because the initial processing rate has
considered the maximum transmitting delay of tasks, the
traffic affect on the task response time is omitted to reduce
the difficulty of our problem in the following NBS method.
According to the above propositions and the NBS defi-
nition [29], formally, problem P1 can be converted into the
following optimization problem (labeled P2).
P2 minimize −
H∑
j=1
ln(µ0ij − ρij λˆi), i = 1, · · · , n, (19)
subject to
∑H
j=1
ρij = 1, (20)
ρij ≥ 0, j = 1, · · · , H, (21)
ρij λˆi ≤ µ
0
ij , j = 1, · · · , H. (22)
As the utility function of the mobile user is reset by
Expression (19), let T ′ denote their new utility function
collection, the non-cooperative game G can be rewritten as
G′ = 〈Q, T ′〉.
Theorem 5.1. Non-cooperative game G′ = 〈Q, T ′〉 exists a
Nash equilibrium at least.
Proof. Through observing the formulation of P2, we can
learn that Qi, as the strategy set of MUi, is a non-empty
convex closed and upper-bounded subset on Euclidean
space, and the objective function Eq. (19) is also continu-
ously differentiable and convex for any strategy ρi ∈ Qi.
Therefore, similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can also
assert that the game G′ has at least a Nash equilibrium.
This remark completes the proof.
Given µ0ij = λ
max
ij , ∀j ∈ {1, · · · , H} and sorting all
available computing nodes for MUi in descending order of
their initial performance µ0i1 ≥ µ
0
i2 ≥ · · · ≥ µ
0
iH , we have
the following conclusion.
Theorem 5.2. the solution ρi = {ρi1, · · ·, ρij , · · ·, ρiH} of
optimization problem P2 is given by
ρij =


µ0ij
λˆi
−
∑k
j=1 µ
0
ij − λˆi
kλˆi
, j = 1, · · · , k;
0, j = k + 1, · · · , H.
(23)
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where k ∈ {1, · · · , H} is the largest number exactly satisfying
the following expression.
µ0ik >
∑k
j=1 µ
0
ij − λˆi
k
. (24)
Proof. In our models, assume that the total arrival rate of
tasks generally does not exceed the total processing rate
of the systems. Hence, the constraint (22) is omitted in our
problem.
Let θ ≥ 0, ηj ≥ 0, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , H} denote the La-
grange multipliers. The Lagrangian of problem P2 is given
as follows:
L(ρi1, · · ·, ρiH , θ, η1, · · ·, ηH)
= −
H∑
j=1
ln(µ0ij − ρij λˆi)− θ(
H∑
j=1
ρij − 1)−
H∑
j=1
ηjρij .
(25)
The first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions and constraints
are given as follows:
∂L
∂ρij
=
λˆi
µ0ij − ρij λˆi
− θ − ηj = 0, (26)
subject to the constraints
∂L
∂θ
=
∑H
j=1
ρij − 1 = 0, (27)
ηjρij = 0, ηj ≥ ρij ≥ 0, j = 1, · · · , H. (28)
In terms of Eq. (28), if ρij = 0, we have ηj ≥ 0; otherwise
ηj = 0 . Therefore, combining the Equations (26) and (28),
we have
λˆi
µ0ij − ρij λˆi
{
= θ, if ρij > 0;
≥ θ, if ρij = 0.
(29)
This implies that those computing nodes with lower
performance can be out of the service for MUi, because no
tasks are assigned to them. Hence, only ρij > 0 needs to
be considered under this case. Let k is an integer promising
ρij > 0 for all j ∈ {1, · · · , k}. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions
is rewritten as:
λˆi
µ0ij − ρij λˆi
= θ, j = 1, · · · , k, (30)
subject to
k∑
j=1
ρij = 1. (31)
By adding the equation given by Eq. (30) for all j ∈
{1, · · · , k} and some algebraic calculation, we have
θ =
kλˆi∑k
j=1 µ
0
ij − λˆi
. (32)
Using the above result in Eq. (30), we can obtain
ρij =
µ0ij
λˆi
−
∑k
j=1 µ
0
ij − λˆi
kλˆi
, j = 1, · · · , k. (33)
If we search k from H to 1, it is easy to determine the
largest number k satisfying the condition
µ0ik >
∑k
j=1 µ
0
ij − λˆi
k
,
which guarantees ρij > 0 for all j ∈ {1, · · · , k}.
This remark completes the proof.
Following the result of Theorem 5.2, the Optimal task of-
floading method forMUi is proposed in Algorithm 1 (called
OTOM). In this algorithm, firstly the initial processing per-
formance of each computing node is determined, and then
sorted in descending order (lines 2-3). Appropriate comput-
ing nodes for MUi are picked to deploy tasks such that her
utility can achieve maximization (lines 4-8). It is obvious
that those computing nodes with lower performance will
be removed from the service for MUi, once the algorithm
is finished. Final, each selected computing node is set to a
task allocation probability, others are set to 0 (lines 9-11). As
for the complexity of Algorithm 1, its overhead primarily
focuses on the computation of sorting for computing nodes
and determining the computing nodes participating in the
service with dual loops. Hence, the computation complexity
of Algorithm 1 is O(m log(m)).
Algorithm 1 OTOM(Si, Li, T maxi , λˆi): Optimal task offload-
ing method forMUi
Input:
The available processing rate for MUi on each comput-
ing node: Si = {µi1, · · · , µ
i
H}.
The mean delay of MUi transmitting tasks to each
computing node: Li = {Li1, · · · ,LiH}.
The acceptable maximum response time forMUi: T
max
i .
The mean task arrival rate onMUi: λˆi.
Output:
MUi’ task allocation vector: ρi = {ρi1, · · · , ρiH}.
1: ρi ← {0, · · · , 0}, initializeMUi’ task allocation vector
2: Calculate the initial performance of each computing
node according to Eq. (18), S ← {µ0i1, · · · , µ
0
iH}
3: Sort S in descending order
4: υ ←
∑|S|
j=1 µ
0
ij − λˆi
|S|
5: while υ > µ0
i|S| do
6: S ← S\{µ0i|S|}
7: υ ←
∑|S|
j=1 µ
0
ij − λˆi
|S|
8: end while
9: for j ← 1 to |S| do
10: ρij ←
µ0ij − υ
λˆi
11: end for
12: return ρi
5.2 Distributed task offloading algorithm
In this subsection, we proposed a distributed task offload-
ing algorithm (called DITOA) for non-cooperative game
G′, which are elaborated in Algorithm 2. The players (the
mobile users) in the game act asynchronously. First, the
expected task response time and allocation probability for
all players are preset to 0 (lines 1-2). Each player employs
OTOM algorithm to update her own optimal strategy in
round-robin manner (lines 5-10). Specially, to recalculate
the task offloading strategy, we reduce the number of tasks
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that were assigned to each computing node in the previous
round (line 7). Moreover, a deviation ξ, as the conver-
gence condition, is built to measure whether the system
has reached a Nash equilibrium. That is, the algorithm gets
through when the cumulative deviation difference between
two adjacent iterations is less than ξ (line 16). While having
completed the strategy update, the mobile user computes
the cumulative deviation and then broadcasts it to other
players (lines 11-13). In just doing so, other players can
decide whether to continue updating their task offloading
strategies based on the advertised information in practice.
Algorithm 2 DITOA(ξ): Distributed task offloading algo-
rithm
Input:
Acceptable deviation: ξ
1: Ti ← 0, ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n}
2: ρi ← {0, · · · , 0}, ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n}
3: repeat
4: sum← 0
5: for eachMUi do
6: Obtain free service rate {µi1, · · · , µ
i
H} and transmit-
ting delay Li ← {Li1, · · · ,LiH} by inspecting the
available computing nodes forMUi
7: µij ← µ
i
j + ρij λˆi, ∀j ∈ {1, · · · , H}
8: Si ← {µi1, · · · , µ
i
H}
9: ρi ← OTOMU(Si,Li, T maxi , λˆi)
10: Update the task offloading strategy by ρi
11: Calculate response time Ti’ using Eq. (8)
12: sum← sum+ |T ′i − Ti|
13: Advertise cumulative deviation sum to all players
14: Ti ← T ′i
15: end for
16: until sum ≤ ξ
The above algorithm can be started periodically or when
system parameters change. For example, when the task
arrival rate on a mobile user changes, she runs immedi-
ately the algorithm to update her task offloading strategy,
and then broadcast the deviation to others. Their strategies
will continue to be updated until the Nash equilibrium is
reached. Besides, the processing rate on the edge cloud
nodes also need to be reported to mobile users in our
methods. The measurement of the processing rate can refer
to the literatures [30]–[32]. In addition, given that the mobile
users employ OTOM to calculate their optimal strategies
in Algorithm 2, the computation complexity of DITOA is
O(nm log(m)). After several iterations, the algorithm will
converge to an efficient equilibrium, and then terminates.
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In the section, we conduct extensive simulation experiments
to measure the performance of the approaches proposed
by us, which include the expected task response time, the
convergence speed of the proposed algorithms and so on.
For comparison purposes, we also implemented two
alternative task allocation methods: proportional-scheme
algorithm (called PS) proposed by the literature [33]; global
optimal scheme (denoted as GOS) employed by the litera-
tures [30], [34], [35]. Our method is labeled DITOA.
The PS algorithm runs in such a manner that assigns
tasks to each computing node in proportion to its processing
rate. Hence, the faster the processing rate of the computing
node is, the greater the probability of assigning tasks to it
is. Allocating tasks to computing node j with PS algorithm,
MUi can employ following expression to calculate the task
allocation probability.
ρij =
µ0ij∑H
j=1 µ
0
ij
. (34)
With respect to the global optimal scheme, it is a central-
ized method, and its objective is to minimize the expected
response time for tasks in our experiments. However, taking
the traffic delay of tasks into account, it is significantly
difficult to achieve the optimal solution with GOS in our
problem. For simplification, the transmitting delay is omit-
ted when we perform our experiments using GOS.
6.1 Configurations
In our simulation experiments, assume that there are six
edge cloud nodes in a fixed physical field. The average pro-
cessing rate of each edge cloud node follows an exponential
distribution, which is elaborated in Table 2.
TABLE 2
The average processing rate of edge cloud nodes
Edge cloud nodes 1 2 3 4 5 6
Average processing
rate (tasks/s)
80 60 100 160 90 70
For the task transmitting delay Lij , we configure it as
a random number distributed evenly in the interval [5ms,
100ms]. The maximum acceptable response time T maxi for
MUi, i ∈ 1, · · · , n, is randomly generated in the interval
[200ms, 280ms]. Additionally, the number of mobile users
in our experiments is set to 20, the task arrival rate of each
user equals to the product of her scaling factor fi and the
aggregated task arrival rate λ. For example, the task arrival
rate ofMUi can be written as
λi = λfi.
The scaling factor fi, i = 1, · · · , n, and the local processing
rate for each mobile user are given in Table 3.
TABLE 3
Scaling factors fi and the local processing rate for each user
Mobile users 1-3 4-7 8-12 13-17 18-20
fi 0.02 0.035 0.04 0.06 0.1
Average processing
rate (tasks/s)
3.6 4.8 5.2 6 7
6.2 Convergence estimation
Since the game method proposed by us needs multiple
iterations to reach the Nash equilibrium, the convergence
rate of the algorithm becomes a significant metric estimating
its performance. In this subsection, we will estimate the
convergence rate of our methods on two aspects: acceptable
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deviate ξ and the load rate of the system. The experimental
parameters consist to the configuration provided above.
For comparison, two types of system initial scenarios
are considered in our simulation experiments. The first is
the initial 0 in which the computing nodes are not assigned
any task; the second is the initial P in which the tasks have
been assigned to each computing node in proportion to their
processing rates.
Firstly, given an acceptable deviate ξ = 0.001, which
means the stop condition of our method and the arrival of
the Nash equilibrium, we estimate the convergence rates of
our algorithm on different system utilization rates, which
are varied in the interval [0.1,0.7] with step 0.1. More-
over, the transmitting delay and the maximum acceptable
response time for users are generated randomly in our
experiments, hence, each experiment on different system
utilization rates is carried out 100 times and its average
results is described in the Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. System utilization rate and convergence rate
Fig. 3 shows that given the convergence condition ξ =
0.001, the average number of iterations of DITOA increases
with the increase of the system utilization rate. The conver-
gence rates varies evenly after the system utilization rate
reaches 0.2. Furthermore, we can observe that the average
number of iterations in the case of initial P is lower than that
of initial 0 in Fig. 3. Generally, the task distribution obeying
the case of initial P is consist with the real scenario where
the initial state of task allocation on computing nodes is
proportional to their processing rate, so the experimental
results demonstrate the effectiveness of our schemes.
Next, given the system utilization rate is set to 0.5, we
estimate the convergence rate of our methods on distinct
acceptable deviates. Similar to the above experiments, we
run the experiments 100 times and then calculate the av-
erage number of iterations as experimental results. Fig. 4
shows that the convergence rate of initial P is prior to that
of initial 0. It implies that the system in the case of initial P
is more close to the Nash equilibrium. Additionally, while
the acceptable deviate is set to 0.01, the average number of
the iteration of our algorithm is 18. The above experiment
results demonstrate that the algorithm proposed by us can
converge quickly in an acceptable deviate range.
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Fig. 4. Acceptable deviate and convergence rate
6.3 Estimation of average response time
In this subsection, we will estimate the average response
time of user tasks by varying the utilization rate of the
system. The parameters of simulation experiments are given
in terms of previous experiment configurations. Consider-
ing that the transmitting delay and the acceptable deviate
are set randomly, similar to the above experiments, each
simulation experiment is also carried out 100 times. The
convergence condition (acceptable deviate) ξ is set to 0.001
in the experiments.
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Fig. 5. 0.1X system utilization rate and the average response time of
user tasks
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Figs. 5 , 6 and 7 present the average task response time
with standard deviate for PS and DITOA methods, when
the system utilization rates are at 0.1X, 0.4X and 0.7X respec-
tively. The experimental results show that the expected task
response time of our method is lower than that of PS method
at distinct system utilization rates. The main reason is that
the strategy employing by users in our method is optimal
for individuals, rather than PS method is not optimal for
individuals due the task allocation in proportion to the
processing rates of computing nodes. Accordingly, it makes
the performance of our method is superior to that of PS.
According to the previous configurations, GOS method
does not need to be executed repeatedly because its trans-
mitting delay is omitted. Furthermore, the result yielded by
GOS is the optimal average response time of the whole sys-
tem. Hence, GOS is not included in the above experiments.
It is obvious that the task response time of each user in PS
and DITOA is different. To compare PS, DITOA and GOS,
we adopt the following expression to normalize their overall
average response time of the tasks.
1∑n
i=1 λˆi
n∑
i=1
λˆiTi(ρi, ρ−i). (35)
Fig. 8 describes the overall average response time of
the task for the three methods at distinct system utilization
rates. It can been seen that the task response time of GOS
is the lowest, and PS is the highest. The primary reason
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Fig. 7. 0.7X system utilization rate and the average response time of
user tasks
is that the transmitting delay is ignored in GOS method.
Specially, while the system utilization rate is low, the task
processing time on the computing node is far less than the
task transmitting delay in DITOA and PS. Obviously, GOS is
superior to the other two methods. Moreover, as the increase
of the system utilization rate, the difference between the
processing time and the transmitting delay decreases, and
the performance of DITOA approaches that of GOS. In
some senses, GOS can be regarded as the optimization
benchmark in our experiments. Therefore, the experimental
results validate the effectiveness of our methods.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the task offloading problem
in the mobile edge cloud computing. We employ NBS ap-
proach to compute themobile user utility, and then present a
non-cooperative game framework and associated algorithm
to address the problem, such that each mobile user can
minimize the expected response time of tasks in a com-
promise scenario (approaching a Nash equilibrium point).
The presented algorithm has relatively low complexity and
distribution execution characteristic, and thus, can be easily
implemented to improve the reliability and robustness of
the system. The effectiveness of our approach was assessed
by performing simulated experiments. The experimental
results demonstrated that our approach could outperform
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alternative popular methods achieving better performance.
Besides, our proposed approach can be applied to other
resource allocation models.
In the future, we plan to explore the VM or container
migration among multiple mobile edge clouds as an exten-
sion of our work. We are also interested in implementing a
prototype allocation system in an experimental edge cloud
platform to further study the performance of our proposed
approach.
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